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The New American Civil Religion:
Lessons for Italy

Andrew Koppelman*

Alessandro Ferrari nicely delineates the predicament
of civil religion in Italy: centered around a Catholicism
that is no longer universal enough to be a basis for
national identity.1 The problems he describes are not
peculiar to Italy. Much of what he complains of has
analogues that are familiar to me as an American lawyer who
studies the law of religion in the United States. We have
a civil religion of our own, with its own gaps,
incoherences, and exclusions. Most pertinently here,
American civil religion has been changing, responding to
increasing religious plurality by becoming more abstract.
Perhaps Italy has, in this respect, an American future.
I.

Why Civil Religion?

Why is there civil religion at all? What’s the point
of these bland, watered-down rituals?
The idea of a civil religion is commonly traced to
Rousseau,2 with a prominent recent updating by Robert
Bellah,3 but the fundamental idea was offered much earlier
by Augustine, who wrote: “A people is the association of a
multitude of rational beings united by common agreement on
the objects of their love.”4 Augustine was transforming an
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earlier definition by Cicero of a community as an
“association of men united by a common sense of right and a
community of interest.” A people’s character, Augustine
thought, was determined by the objects of its love: “the
better the objects of agreement, the better the people.”5
Augustine didn’t think that a people united around
genuinely attractive objects, even a common sense of
justice, could exist in this world: in any earthly
republic, good people would be forced to coexist with evil
ones. A regime was more like a band of thieves, cohesive
out of necessity.6 It took more recent developments to
produce a politics that sought to realize Augustine’s ideal
in this world – not in the sense of a commonwealth ruled by
God, but in the sense of an association united by common
agreement on the (worthy!) object of their love.
Why has an Augustinian ideal become practically
important today? Charles Taylor argues that cohesion has
become more important because of the needs of modern
representative democracy. “Traditional despotisms could
ask of people only that they remain passive and obey the
laws. A democracy . . . has to ask more. It requires that
its members be motivated to make the necessary
contributions: of treasure (in taxes), sometimes blood (in
war), and always of some degree of participation in the
process of governance.”7 This is why states try to
inculcate a sense of patriotism.
This imperative toward a common identity, Taylor
observes, pushes the state in two different directions.
State builders have reached toward secularism, an ethic
independent of confessional differences, “as a potential
common point of allegiance for citizens, above and beyond
their other differences.”8 But at the same time, the
imperative to bond citizens together can create “an allbut-irresistable pull to build the common identity around
the things that strongly unite people, and these are
frequently ethnic or religious identities.”9 In the
limiting case, “the logic of democracy can become that of
ethnic cleansing.”10 Thus democracy does not necessarily
entail liberalism. “Rather it ups the ante: either the
5
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civilized coexistence of diverse groups, or new forms of
savagery.”11
The aim, then, is a middle way between a civic
identity so deracinated that it has no roots in the
specific history of the people it seeks to bind together,
and one so specific that it excludes recent immigrants.
Constructing and maintaining this identity is a delicate
operation, and its demands shift over time as the pertinent
population shifts.
Even when civil religion succeeds in performing its
unifying function, it can still generate pathologies.
American civil religion is an example. It does produce a
culture in which many people feel that their religious
beliefs are somehow associated with patriotism. This has
the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and common
moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism. It also
has the less attractive effect of encouraging selfrighteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the United
States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely
sanctioned.12
I have not mentioned one desideratum that is typically
overvalued in the academy: intellectual tidiness. Civil
religion is always likely to be somewhat incoherent,
because it will have been cobbled together for ends that
are not intellectual. That does not mean that there is
anything wrong with it. The American civil religion, for
example, is decidedly untidy but largely does its job,
albeit with the pathologies I have just mentioned.
More pertinently, American civil religion is changing.
It is becoming more abstract and therefore more inclusive.
This, I will argue, is a sensible response to the
fragmentation of religion caused by immigration, which is
an issue all over the world. In what follows, I will
describe America’s civil religion and then offer some
possible lessons for Italy.
II.

The Old American Civil Religion

Here are some familiar and well-settled rules of
American Establishment Clause law. The state may not
engage in speech that endorses a particular religion, or
11
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See Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the
American Constitution, in How Does the Constitution Protect Religious
Freedom? 141 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds. 1987). For recent
examples of the latter unattractive effect, see Andrew Koppelman,
Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 Dissent 64 (Spring, 2006).
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religion generally.13 It may not use a religious test for
office.14 A law is invalid if it lacks a secular
legislative purpose,15 or if it purposefully discriminates
against certain religious practices.16 Laws may not
discriminate among religions.17
Yet at the same time, there is a broad range of
official religious practices that are tolerated. “In God
We Trust” appears on the currency, legislative sessions
begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with “God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,”
Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of
course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of
Allegiance. The Court has sometimes claimed that these
practices of ceremonial deism are not really religious, but
that is a silly argument, since they are overtly and
conspicuously religious.18
Only recently has anyone on the Court articulated a
principle that purports to distinguish permissible from
impermissible deism. The general rule now seems to be that
old forms of deism are grandfathered, but newer ones are
unconstitutional. Thus, the Court recently held that an
official Ten Commandments display is unconstitutional if it
was erected recently, but not if it has been around for
decades.19 Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in a
decision concerning the inclusion of the words “under God”
in the Pledge of Allegiance,20 explicitly made the age of a
ceremonial acknowledgement relevant to its
constitutionality. She thought that constitutionality was
supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the absence
of reference to a particular religion, and minimal
13

See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), and
cases discussed therein.
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(1993).
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Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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This is elegantly argued by Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of
Church and State: A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence
62-80 (1995).
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See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)(invalidating
recently erected display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(upholding 40-year-old display). Justice Breyer, the only judge in the
majority in both cases, relied on the divisiveness rationale in
explaining his position. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer,
J., concurring). I will argue here that there are better grounds for
his position than the ones he states.
20
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religious content. But the first of her factors was
“history and ubiquity.” “The constitutional value of
ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its
legitimate nonreligious purposes,” O’Connor wrote. “That
sort of understanding can exist only when a given practice
has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation's
history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it
can fairly be called ubiquitous.”21 The consequence is to
make old and familiar forms of ceremonial deism
constitutional, but to discourage innovation.
There are two aspects of this area of the law that
distinguish it.
The first is that it represented a common ground
strategy - an effort, in its own time, to understand
“religion” in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way. At the
time that these elements of civil religion were put in
place, the existence of God appeared to be the one aspect
of religion that was common to the various religious
factions then dominant in American life. This was true of
the vague deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence
and the speeches of the Presidents, beginning with
Washington; it was also true of the idea of a “JudeoChristian” ethic that was invented in the 1950s.22 This old
settlement is part of the background in which contemporary
American religion has developed. Its continuation is not
an effort by an incumbent administration to manipulate
religion or a triumphalist effort to exclude outsiders. It
simply recognizes that people are invested, in some cases
very deeply, in the status quo.23
The second is that new manifestations are not at all
ecumenical. America was once an overwhelmingly Protestant
nation. Today it remains majority Christian, but
monotheism is no longer universal. There are a lot of
Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists. If you add up the
Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Orthodox, Jews, Muslims, and Unitarians in the 2009

21

Id. at 37.
See Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World
War II 40-53 (1988); Noah Feldman, Divided By God: America’s ChurchState Problem – And What We Should Do About It 164-70 (2005).
Nonsectarian Bible reading was a less attractive and less successful
variant, since it quickly became inflected with anti-Catholicism. See
Feldman at 61-92, 108-110.
23
See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1227 (2003).
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Statistical Abstract of the United States, you end up with
only 81% of the population.24
Today, the invocation of theism, and specifically the
erection of a Ten Commandments display, is an intervention
in the bitterest religious controversies that now divide
us. Douglas Laycock thinks that a lesson of O’Connor’s
opinion is that “separationist groups should sue
immediately when they encounter any religious practice
newly sponsored by the government.”25 That is precisely the
right lesson for them to take. New sponsorship of
religious practices is far more likely to represent a
contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live religious
controversy than the perpetuation of old forms.
The theological content of the civil religion has been
becoming steadily thinner. Descriptions by two
sociologists, twenty years apart, show the direction of
change.
Robert Bellah observed in 1967 that there are
“certain common elements of religious orientation that the
great majority of Americans share” and that “provide a
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life,
including the political sphere.”26 This orientation, which
he labeled “the American civil religion,”27 included as its
tenets “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward
of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of
24

U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2009
(129th ed. 2008), tbl. 74, at 59. Further data on non-monotheists are
compiled in Frederick Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion:
Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 275,
284-85 (2007).
The Statistical Abstract lists 16.1% as “unaffiliated,” which it
defines as “atheist, agnostic, and nothing in particular,” but the
numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than this suggests. The
proportion of Americans who report having no religious preference
doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its level
for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998. However, most of the
members of this category are in fact religious. More than half believe
in God, more than half believe in life after death, about a third
believe in heaven and hell, and 93 percent sometimes pray. The most
careful study of this group concludes that the newer members of this
group are mostly “unchurched believers” who declare no religious
preference in an effort to express their distance from the Religious
Right. Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No
Religious Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Sociological
Rev. 165 (2002).
25
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 232 (2004).
26
Bellah, Civil Religion in America, supra note __, at 3-4.
27
Id. at 4.
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religious intolerance.”28 This civil religion does not,
however, include such controversial matters as the divinity
of Jesus Christ. “The God of the civil religion is not
only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side,
much more related to order, law, and right than to
salvation and love.”29
Robert Wuthnow observed in 1988 that the American
civil religion described by Bellah had been fragmenting in
recent years into two very different visions.30 A
conservative narrative holds that America’s government is
legitimate because it reflects biblical principles and has
the potential to evangelize the world. A liberal narrative
holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast
resources to alleviate the material problems that face the
world. In this liberal narrative, “[f]aith plays a role
chiefly as a motivating element, supplying strength to keep
going against what often appear as insuperable odds.”31 The
two visions have become increasingly hostile to one
another. As a consequence, neither can effectively claim
to speak for common American values.
III.

The New American Civil Religion

The American civic religion would thus appear to be
paralyzed. It is not. A new American civil religion is
emerging, readily visible on the statute books, more
abstract than its predecessor but with definite
consequences.
The most important recent innovation in symbolic
endorsement is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
its cognates, at the federal and state level. The RFRA
laws pervasively single out religion for special treatment
in the law. They require courts to consider religious (and
only religious) accommodation claims, and to grant them
unless there is some very strong state interest to the
contrary. The Federal RFRA was invalidated by the Supreme
Court as applied to state and local government, but
continues to apply to federal action. The Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act protects religion
(and only religion) from land use and prison regulations.
Similar protections against state law are given by many
state constitutions and state Religious Freedom Restoration
28

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
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See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion 241-67
(1988).
31
Id. at 251.
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Acts.32 There are thousands of exemptions in specific
statutory schemes, and the Supreme Court has held that
these are permissible even when they are not
constitutionally required.33
The sentiment in favor of such accommodations is
nearly unanimous in the United States. When Congress
enacted RFRA, the bill passed unanimously in the House and
drew only three opposing votes in the Senate.34
It is surprisingly uncertain what is the object of all
this protection. None of the RFRAs offer a definition of
religion, and some of them reject usage that identifies it
with conscience (which is the substitute most commonly
offered by those who object to singling out religion). The
most recent Congressional pronouncement on religious
liberty, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, declares that “[t]he term ‘religious
exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”35
A vague understanding of “religion” seems to be
unavoidable. The best treatments of the problem of
defining “religion” for constitutional purposes, most
prominently that of Kent Greenawalt, have concluded that no
dictionary definition will do, because no single feature
unites all the things that are indisputably religions.
Religions just have a “family resemblance” to one another.
In doubtful cases, one can only ask how close the analogy
is between a putative instance of religion and the
indisputable instances.36
32

For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge
of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but
Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 211-12 & nn.368-73 (2004).
33
All this is documented in Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of
Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 3-6, 19-21 (2000).
34
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 160 (1997).
35
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Some of the state statutes mandating
religious accommodation have similar language. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §41-1493 (West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §761.02 (West Supp. 2004);
Idaho Code §73-401 (Michie Supp. 2004); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/5
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§1.302 (West Supp. 2004);
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§110.001 (West Supp. 2004). But see
71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§2403 (West Supp. 2004)(adopting a more
restrictive definition of a substantial burden).
36
I have elaborated this point in Corruption of Religion and the
Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831, 1905-08 (2009). See
also William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 142
(Paul Edwards ed. 1967); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for
the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983);
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal.
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This process need not yield indeterminacy. The concept
of “family resemblance” is drawn from the philosophy of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously argued that “the meaning
of a word is its use in the language.”37 Thus, for example,
there is no single thing common to “games” which makes them
all games, but “similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that.”38 The use of the word “game” is
thus not circumscribed by any clear rule. But that does
not mean that it is not circumscribed at all. “[N]o more
are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in
tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all of that
and has rules too.”39
Explaining Wittgenstein’s idea here, Charles Taylor
observes that, with respect to a great many rule-guided
social practices,
the “rule” lies essentially in the practice. The rule
is what is animating the practice at any given time, and
not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our
thoughts or our brains or our genes, or whatever.
That’s why the rule is, at any time, what the practice
has made it.40
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus,
for instance, are not codified anywhere. But natives of
the culture may understand quite well what they are, and
there may be no doubt at all as to how they apply in
particular cases, even if they have not been codified and
could not be codified.41
L. Rev. 753 (1984); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1181-83
(2d ed. 1988); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107
Yale L.J. 791 (1997); 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution:
Free Exercise and Fairness 124-156 (2006); Andrew Koppelman, Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125-139 (2002). Courts in Europe have done
no better in devising a definition. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious
Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26 (2005). Indeed, it appears that no
jurisdiction in the world has managed to solve this problem. See T.
Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of
“Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003). Lest
one think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an
artifact of academic preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is
also used by that singularly hardheaded entity, the Internal Revenue
Service. See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 EST.,
GIFTS & TR. PORTFOLIOS (BNA) ch. III (2007), available at
http://taxandaccounting. bna.com/btac/.
37
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958).
38
Id. at 31.
39
Id. at 33.
40
Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule, in Philosophical Arguments 178
(1995).
41
See Al Yankovic, Another One Rides the Bus (Placebo Records 1981).
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The definition of religion in American law works just
this way. There is no set of necessary and sufficient
conditions that will make something a “religion.” But it
is remarkable how few cases have arisen in which courts
have had real difficulty in determining whether something
is a religion or not.42
One possible way of promoting religious neutrality,
while still maintaining a civil religion, is to
conceptualize the good of religion at a very high level of
abstraction. Neutrality is fluid; it is available in many
specifications.43
The American approach is one defensible specification.
The state is agnostic about religion, but it is an
interested and sympathetic agnosticism. The state does not
say “I don’t know and you don’t either.” Rather it
declares the value of religion in a carefully noncommittal
way: “It would be good to find out. And we encourage your
efforts to do that.”
The precise character of the good being promoted is
itself deliberately left vague, because the broad consensus
on freedom of religion would surely collapse if we had to
state with specificity the value promoted by religion.
“Religion” denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation
(if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the
transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),44
responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of
As Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term “religion” denotes an
anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice
of encountering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated
with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to deal.
Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies
269 (Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998). Arising thus out of a specific
historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter,
“religion” would be surprising if it had any essential denotation.
42
The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of
“religion” is a remarkably short one. See Religion, 36C Words and
Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008). The reference I rely on here,
Words and Phrases, is a 132 volume set collecting brief annotations of
cases from 1658 to the present. Each case discusses the contested
definition of a word whose meaning determines rights, duties,
obligations, and liabilities of the parties. See Words and Phrases, in
West's Encyclopedia of American Law (2d ed. 2008). Some words have
received an enormous amount of attention from the courts. Two
examples, drawn at random from the first volume of this immense
compilation, each exceed 100 pages: Abandonment, 1 Words and Phrases
37-147 (2007); Abuse of Discretion, id. at 323-462 and, in the 2008
supplement, 8-25.
43
See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF POLITICS
633 (2004).
44
John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980).
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human life (if it is imperfect),45 courage in the face of
the heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind
of encouragement helps),46 a transcendent underpinning for
the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning
helps),47 contact with that which is awesome and
indescribable (if awe is something you feel),48 and many
others. No general description of the good that religion
seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or
intellectually.49 The establishment clause permits the
state to favor religion so long as “religion” is understood
very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference
among religions or religious propositions.
By grandfathering the old civil religion, and saying
that it could proceed as far as it has and no further, the
Supreme Court has essentially declared it immune from
further tinkering. The new civil religion, on the other
hand, continues to generate new law and new procedures.
Religion is a topic that incumbent administrations must now
remain silent about. It is even more abstract than
Bellah’s Unitarian civic God. It is a negative God, a God
without predicates.50 It reveals its reverence for the
Absolute by omitting all reference to it in public
decisionmaking. The aspiration evidently is for an
eloquent silence, like a rest in music.
IV.

A Model for Italy?

Prof. Ferrari’s paper focuses on two persistent
questions that plague American as well as Italian law.

Can

45

Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction
17-34 (1999).
46
Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952).
47
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone (1794; New York: Harper, 1960).
48
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (2d ed. 1950).
49
Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of
religion:
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be
established. I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful
élans and aspirations which humans have manifested in the
spiritual realm, and relate them to some single set of underlying
needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning
or something else). The phenomena are much too varied and
baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would
have to stand at the end of history to be able to draw such
conclusions.
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 679 (2007).
50
See Anthony Kenny, Worshipping an Unknown God, 19 Ratio (n.s.) 441
(2006).
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the state symbolically endorse religion, and if so, of what
kind? Can the state fund religious activity, either as
such or as part of a broader program of funding to which
religious claimants are incidentally entitled?
A.

Symbolic endorsement

The Italian state has for a long time used the symbols
of the Catholic Church as the basis of its civic identity.
With growing diversity,51 Catholicism can no longer perform
this unifying function. Prof. Ferrari’s paper nicely
delineates the problem. It won’t do to say, as Italian
officials now do, that the crucifix is just a symbol of
tradition. This move is bound to produce controversy,
because the symbol in question is so inescapably specific.
And it has in fact been the occasion of bitter division.52
51

The U.S. State Department reports:
An estimated 87 percent of native-born citizens are nominally
Catholic, but only 20 percent regularly participate in worship
services. Other significant Christian communities include
Orthodox, Jehovah's Witnesses, Assembly of God, the Confederation
of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and other small Protestant
groups. Non-Catholic Christian groups, Muslims, Jews, Hindus,
Baha'is, and Buddhists constitute less than 5 percent of the
population and, with the exception of Jews, are mainly foreignborn. Immigration, both legal and illegal, continues to add large
numbers of non-Christian residents, mainly Muslims, from North
Africa, South Asia, Albania, and the Middle East. The Ministry of
Interior reports that there are 258 places of Islamic worship
(mainly "garage" mosques) and 628 Islamic associations
concentrated in Lombardy, Veneto, Lazio, Emilia Romagna, and
Tuscany. The Jewish community is estimated at 30,000 and
maintains synagogues in 21 cities. The most recent data indicate
that approximately 14 percent of the population identifies itself
as either atheist or agnostic. (Numbers do not add up to 100
percent because of overlapping categories.)

International Religious Freedom Report 2008, U.S. State Dept. Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sept. 19, 2008, available at
http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2008_09/alia
/a8091901.htm.
52

The State Department reports:
On February 7, 2007, former Justice Minister Mastella said the
crucifix was a symbol of traditional Italian culture and values
and therefore could be displayed in public buildings. On February
21, 2008, courts condemned a judge to 1 year's imprisonment and
barred him from holding office for having failed to perform his
duties after his 2006 refusal to preside in a courtroom where a
crucifix was displayed. On January 30, 2008, a local police
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The trick loses its persuasiveness when the religious
meaning is too overt. The claim that the crucified Christ
simply stands for civic values is one that cannot be made
with a straight face.53
Given demographic shifts, Italy is going to be pushed
in the direction of abstraction, just as the United States
has. Italy’s basic problem is that its civil religion is
more specific, less Unitarian, than America’s has been.
There’s no obvious way out of this. Because of the
religious specificity of the historical symbol,
grandfathering won’t work as well as it has in the United
States, though even here it hasn’t made everyone happy. But
some way to move toward greater abstraction has got to be
invented.
I can’t say much here about the possibilities of human
inventiveness, but one notable experiment was a Milan
clinic manager’s attempt to replace crucifixes with
pictures of the Madonna, “an image which appeals to Muslim
women as well.”54 The manager was promptly overruled and
nothing came of the proposal, but it is intriguing. A
Madonna is easily pictured merely as a mother and child, an
image that has an appeal that transcends Catholicism. It
may be ambiguous enough to satisfy the requirement of
increasing abstraction. From across the Atlantic, I can’t
tell if the manager is right, but what he is attempting is
the kind of studied vagueness that Italy needs.
B.

Funding religion

American practice also can help with the difficult
question whether the state can permissibly fund religious
activities. In Italy, a religious community can receive
funding, through a voluntary checkoff on tax returns, if it
so requests. In order to receive these benefits, the group

officer in Catania appealed the ruling of a civil court stating a
crucifix and a statue of Mary could be displayed in public
offices. In 2006 the Council of State, the national appeals court
for administrative cases, rejected a request made by a mother to
remove crucifixes from her children's classrooms. The court
determined that the presence of religious symbols in public
buildings is not discriminatory as they epitomize civil values.
Id.
The privileged status of Catholicism is even starker where state
pensions are available to certain Catholic families, but not to
similarly situated non-Catholic families. See Ferrari ms. at 15-16.
54
Milan Clinic in Crucifix Row, ANSA English Media Service, May 9,
2007.
53
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must reach an accord with the government. The consequence
is that there are two classes of religion in Italy, those
that have reached an accord with the government and those
that have not. Notably, no accord has yet been reached
with Islam.
The pressure to reach such an accord has produced a
vexing predicament for the government. Italian Muslims are
drawn from many countries, dispersed across Italy, and not
cohesive or organized. “Twenty years after the first
massive wave of Muslim immigration,” a Hudson Institute
report states, “Italy’s Muslim community is characterized
by the presence of many Muslim organizations, none of which
can legitimately claim to represent more than a fraction of
it. Moreover, the relationships among these organizations
are often characterized by sharp disagreements and even
personal hatreds, leaving the country’s Muslim community
The Muslim
deprived of a unified leadership.”55
organization with the largest following, the UCOII (Union
of the Islamic Communities and Organizations of Italy), has
links with the Muslim Brotherhood and has sometimes
endorsed suicide bombings and strong anti-Semitism. Most
Italian Muslims do not appear to share UCOII’s politicized
view of Islam, but it is the organization with the
strongest claim to an accord with the government. Such an
accord would make UCOII the sole official representative of
the country’s Muslim community.
Only UCOII, for example, would choose the curriculum
for the teaching of Islam in public schools, appoint
imams serving in hospitals, prisons and the military,
and celebrate weddings according to the Islamic rite
that would have legal value. This position of virtual
monopoly that UCOII would gain from such an agreement
would not be accepted by minority groups within
Italian Islam (such as Shia, Sufis, or Ahmadiyya), nor
by all those Sunni Muslims—and they seem to be the
majority—who do not share UCOII’s conservative
interpretation of Islam. Strong pressures on the
Italian authorities to turn down UCOII’s proposals
have come, in fact, from various members of the
Italian Muslim community and from the Muslim
governments whose ambassadors sit on the board of the
55
Lorenzo Vidino, Islam, Islamism, and Jihad in Italy (Aug. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/islamislamism-and-jihadism-in-italy; for another analysis that reaches
similar conclusions, see James A. Toronto, Islam Italiano: Prospects
for Integration of Muslims in Italy’s Religious Landscape, 28 J. Muslim
Minority Aff. 61 (2008).
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Rome Grand Mosque and whose ideological and political
rivalry with UCOII has always been one of the main
challenges to the creation of a unified Muslim
leadership in Italy.56
Thus the government has declined to sign an accord with
UCOII. But so long as there is no accord, Islam will have
a second-class status in Italian law. None of the options
are attractive.
In American law, the Supreme Court struggled for years
with the question whether the state may fund religious
activities, such as religious schools. For years, it tried
to determine whether state funding was directly or
indirectly supporting religious activity, without coherent
result.57 It’s clear that some direct support must be
permissible. The fire department isn’t required to stand
aside and watch the church burn, even though when it puts
out the fire, state funds are directly aiding religion.
On this basis, in Mitchell v. Helms,58 a four-justice
plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that a valid
secular purpose can validate a program that directly aids
religious activities. The argument is that equal access is
as neutral as anything can be. But there is a danger that
such programs will lead to religious oppression, by in
effect creating a union of church and state that oppresses
nonadherents of the majority creed. Thus, for example, a
school voucher program, such as that which the Court upheld
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,59 could lead to a situation in
which the only good schools in a given area are pervasively
religious, thereby forcing parents who want a decent
education for their children to accept a religious
education from a denomination whose doctrines it rejects.
Forced religious indoctrination is one of the core evils
that the establishment clause is aimed at preventing.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in Zelman, suggested that the
test was whether a program in fact offered “genuine
nonreligious options.”60
The difficulties of recognizing religions one at a
time are avoided by the American approach, which precludes
recognizing specific religious groups. In the United
States, each church needs to raise its own funds, though
56

Vidino, Islam, Islamism, and Jihad in Italy.
The case law and its pathologies are well described in Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution
22-50 (2007).
58
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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Id. at 676.
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contributions are tax deductible. This has an obvious
advantage over the Italian solution: the state doesn’t have
to decide, at least for funding purposes, what counts as a
religion, or how much money each religion should get.
Conclusion
The appropriate specification of the relation between
state and religion will always reflect the particular needs
of political life at specific times and places, and depend
on local conditions, above all religious demographics. But
there is enough typicality to the problems presented that
cross-national comparison, and even advice, is possible.
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